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Pressure-testing a startup idea before you commit

The Founders work group lays out the tests they would run before committing, and what Twitch, Coda, Pinterest, LinkedIn, PayPal and Notion taught them.

Updated October 13, 2026

Set a behavior bar before the team gets attached, watch whether people return to a real task, and write down how the company could fail even if early users love it.

  • Ask questions that can change the idea. Emmett Shear called 40 to 50 streamers and learned that even a few dollars of income mattered to them, which led Justin.tv to share ad revenue. He would specify in advance what repeat use or growth justifies more time and money.
  • Put it into someone's real work. Shishir Mehrotra brought in Coda's first outside customer four months after the team moved its own work into it, and that team's refusal to continue exposed problems internal use had missed. Ivan Zhao would ask someone to finish a familiar task in both the new product and the old one, and watch where they switch back.
  • List the ways it could fail. Reid Hoffman would write down two or three ways the company could fail even if early users love it, with a plan and a fallback for each. He would also ask founders to name the next proof point and its date: PayPal moved to the Palm Pilot because a version could work in about six months.
  • Test your own commitment. Shishir asks whether you have an idea you can't leave alone and a teammate you can't build it without. Ben Silbermann would give the idea a bounded, serious period of work, then ask whether he still wants the hard parts he has met.

Group chat with Emmett, Ben, Ivan, Reid, Shishir — the Founders work group

Question:

How should a founder pressure-test a startup idea before committing to it?

Emmett Shear
Emmett ShearCEO of Softmax. Founder of Justin.tv and former CEO of Twitch
I would make the first test about whose behavior the product depends on. At Justin.tv, I initially reasoned from my experience as a viewer. But viewers followed streamers, so the streamer was the person I needed to understand. I called roughly 40 to 50 streamers and asked how they got started, why they kept streaming, and what they would change. Their answers surprised me: even a few dollars of income mattered to them. That led us to let streamers run an ad and share the revenue. Ask questions that can change your idea, rather than questions designed to confirm it.Spotify
Then set a time limit and a behavior-based bar before the team gets attached. When we had three months to compare directions, we set a target of roughly 20% to 25% monthly usage growth for Justin.tv Gaming; it grew about 30% a month during the test. Later, gaming was growing 25% to 30% monthly for almost nine months before Twitch had its own domain. For a new idea, the exact threshold depends on the product, but I would specify in advance what repeat use or growth would justify committing more time and money.Spotify+1
Shishir Mehrotra
Shishir MehrotraCEO of Superhuman (formerly Grammarly). Co-founder of Coda and former Chief Product Officer of YouTube
I think a founder should run three tests before committing.
First, name the specific change that makes the idea possible now. With Coda, my insight was that the line between documents and apps was artificial. I asked what had kept people from crossing it earlier, because a good idea needs an answer to that barrier.Apple Podcasts
Second, test your own commitment and your ability to recruit. I ask aspiring founders whether they have an idea they cannot imagine leaving alone and a person they cannot imagine building it without. Alex and I made a list of people we wanted on the founding team and agreed to start only if all of them joined. They did. That gave us a stronger signal than encouragement from friends.alejandrocremades+1
Third, put an early version into someone else's working day and watch whether they keep using it. We moved our own work into Coda and brought in our first outside customer four months later. That team's eventual refusal to continue exposed specific product problems that our own use had missed.Apple Podcasts
Ben Silbermann
Ben SilbermannFounder and Chairman of Pinterest. Founder of How We Feel
I think the strongest early test is whether someone makes room for the product in a real task. With Pinterest, Evan and I wanted a place to collect things we found online, and we used the first version constantly. Early users later wrote to us when the site went down because they depended on it to plan a wedding or redecorate a home. Those messages told us more than a signup count could.Apple Podcasts
I’d pressure-test in three passes. Build one experience you’re proud to ask someone to spend time on. Put it in front of people with the underlying need, then watch whether they return and what they try to do with it. Finally, look for more people with that same need and see whether you can reach them. Pinterest had roughly 3,000 registered accounts after its first few months, yet a small group loved making collections; we spent time with those users and found more people like them.startuparchive Set a time and savings limit for the test, since a meaningful signal can take longer than an initial launch.
Emmett Shear
Emmett ShearCEO of Softmax. Founder of Justin.tv and former CEO of Twitch
Shishir's outside-customer test also needs enough time to tell you what failed. During Kiko, we'd spend about three weeks building another idea, launch it, and move on when it failed to take off immediately. We tried roughly six startups in eighteen months that way. The launches taught us how people reacted, but our assumption that a good product would grow instantly was wrong.Apple Podcasts
I would define the test as a sequence: get a specific user to try the product, learn why they return or leave, change the product, and see whether the behavior changes. One weak launch is evidence about that launch. Repeated failure to get the same users back after addressing their stated problems is much stronger evidence about the idea.
Reid Hoffman
Reid HoffmanCo-founder of LinkedIn, Inflection AI and Manas AI. Partner at Greylock
Find the smartest critics you can and ask them to name the specific reasons the idea could fail. When I started LinkedIn, those conversations exposed the hard problems early. My reason for continuing was a set of beliefs I could defend: people would use real identities online, professional relationships deserved their own place, and invitations could help the network grow. Smart disagreement gave us a list of risks to work through; conviction required a reason to believe we could solve them.Spotify
A second question is whether the first use case can grow into the larger opportunity. For LinkedIn, job hunting and finding talent were the first applications of a broader professional network. I would ask who gets value on day one, how those people bring in the next group, and whether that activity makes the product more useful. If your plan depends on network effects, explain how the first group gets value before the network is large.Spotify+1
Ivan Zhao
Ivan ZhaoFounder of Notion
People need to recognize the task your product helps them finish. My friends needed websites, and I kept building them by hand. That gave me a problem I could observe rather than a concept I had to explain.Spotify
We still chose the wrong first form for the product. We spent a couple of years trying to make it easy for everyone to create software, then showed it to friends and investors. The response was weak. Most people wanted to get their work done, so we built around the document and productivity tasks they already understood.Apple Podcasts
I would put a rough version in front of someone doing a real task and watch whether they come back to finish another one. Then I would check whether the product can reach those people and whether the value gives them a reason to pay. Those were separate problems we had to solve at Notion.Apple Podcasts
Shishir Mehrotra
Shishir MehrotraCEO of Superhuman (formerly Grammarly). Co-founder of Coda and former Chief Product Officer of YouTube
One caution on the early-customer test: a detailed complaint list can tell you where the first version hurts, while still giving you the wrong build order. Our first outside Coda team stopped using the product and handed us roughly 30 requested fixes. We took the feedback seriously, yet the team had only seen the table-based part of a product meant to combine documents and apps. We built the rest of that experience instead of treating their list as the roadmap.Apple Podcasts
For a team product, I would set a second behavioral test after repeat use: does someone take it into another team without the founder doing the selling? We began to feel product-market fit when Coda spread that way, around three to three and a half years in. The time it took is specific to Coda; the useful test is whether the product moves through the organization on its own.Apple Podcasts
Emmett Shear
Emmett ShearCEO of Softmax. Founder of Justin.tv and former CEO of Twitch
Reid's question about value before the network is large has a concrete test: recruit the first supply-side users one at a time and see whether they bring their audience. For Justin.tv Gaming, we improved the service around streamers' problems, then asked streamers to switch. Some larger streamers received a payment to do so. Each streamer told their followers where to watch, and those viewers discovered other channels. That cycle was already working before we launched Twitch as a separate site.Apple Podcasts
A founder with a two-sided idea should write down the first group's reason to join, the cost of recruiting them, and the next group's path in. Then test whether each new participant actually helps recruit or retain the next one. Otherwise the growth story is still an assumption.
Ben Silbermann
Ben SilbermannFounder and Chairman of Pinterest. Founder of How We Feel
Emmett's point about a weak launch matters because reach is part of the test. When Pinterest had a small audience, we met with people who loved making collections and reached out to bloggers whose readers shared that interest. We also tried Pin It Forward, where people made a board and invited others to make one. That let us see whether the product had meaning beyond our own circle and whether its users could bring in more people.forbes+1
I’d treat distribution as a separate question in the trial: can you find a group with the need, show them one useful thing, and see some of them introduce it to peers? If the first people care but you cannot find a repeatable way to reach others like them, you have learned where to focus the next test.
Reid Hoffman
Reid HoffmanCo-founder of LinkedIn, Inflection AI and Manas AI. Partner at Greylock
A usage test leaves some of the biggest risks unanswered. When I evaluated Airbnb, the possibility of failure was obvious. I wanted a plan for each major risk, plus another route if the first plan failed; I also asked whether solving those risks would give the company time to build a marketplace before competitors followed.Spotify
Before committing, write down the two or three ways the company could fail even if early users love the product. For each, specify what you can learn now, what resources the answer requires, and what you will do if the first approach fails. A difficult risk can make an idea more compelling when the team has a credible way through it.Spotify
Ivan Zhao
Ivan ZhaoFounder of Notion
Shishir's point about the 30 fixes gets at a hard distinction: feedback should change your understanding of the person's task, while the founder still has to choose the product. I handled Notion's support tickets for the first couple of years and treated each request as feedback about the product and the business. We also used Notion for our own work every day, which let us check a request against how the product actually felt to use.Apple Podcasts
In a pressure test, I would sort the complaints by the work people were trying to finish, then change one part of the product and see whether the same people can finish that work. A feature request is a clue about a blocked task. The next version has to prove it solves the task.
Ben Silbermann
Ben SilbermannFounder and Chairman of Pinterest. Founder of How We Feel
There’s also a limit to what a spare-time test can tell you about your own willingness to build the company. Before Pinterest, I kept starting side projects and finding reasons to stop. I eventually realized that my own commitment was the variable I could change, and leaving my job made me follow through. That was a personal lesson, rather than a rule that everyone should quit first.forbes
I’d give the idea a bounded, serious period of work, with enough time to build something useful and meet the people using it. Then I’d ask whether I still want to work on the hard parts I’ve actually encountered, including finding users and responding when the product fails them.
Shishir Mehrotra
Shishir MehrotraCEO of Superhuman (formerly Grammarly). Co-founder of Coda and former Chief Product Officer of YouTube
I would measure two different signals once people have tried the product: how much they would miss it, and whether they recommend it. In a conversation about product-market fit, I described Rahul Vohra's question, "How disappointed would you be if you could no longer use the product?" His suggested benchmark was 40% answering "very disappointed." I also compared it with net promoter score, which asks about recommending the product.Apple Podcasts
Those questions can point in different directions. Early Coda users gave high disappointment scores and low recommendation scores; Superhuman showed the reverse pattern in our comparison. I would use the gap to choose the next investigation. When users depend on the product yet hesitate to recommend it, ask what makes sharing it difficult. When they recommend it yet could easily switch away, ask what job would make it part of their regular work.Apple Podcasts
Ivan Zhao
Ivan ZhaoFounder of Notion
Reid's risk test should include the technical foundation when the idea depends on a new way of building software. At Notion, we bet on web components before the technology had settled. When the product broke, we struggled to tell whether the bug came from our code or the underlying libraries, and we had to rebuild on a different foundation.Apple Podcasts
Before committing to a product with that kind of dependency, I would build its hardest interaction first and run it through ordinary use with a small group. Record what breaks, how long it takes to fix, and whether the same experience works with a simpler foundation. Early demand tells you the work is worth doing; the technical test tells you whether this team can deliver it with the time and money available.
Emmett Shear
Emmett ShearCEO of Softmax. Founder of Justin.tv and former CEO of Twitch
There is another test inside the streamer story: take an answer that sounds implausible to you and make it concrete. Streamers told me they wanted to earn money. I assumed a tiny amount would feel pointless; one streamer was excited by the prospect of making about $17 a month. We invited roughly 50 streamers into an early partner program where they could trigger an ad and receive half the revenue. They liked it even while earnings were small.Apple Podcasts
For a new idea, ask what people would actually do for the proposed value, then offer a small working version and watch them use it. The size of the action matters: a streamer choosing to run an ad tells you something a favorable interview answer cannot.
Ben Silbermann
Ben SilbermannFounder and Chairman of Pinterest. Founder of How We Feel
The first people who need the product may surprise you. We expected interest from the tech crowd, yet Pinterest’s early users included people in the Midwest planning meals, homes, and events. Their everyday uses gave us a clearer picture of whom we were serving.Apple Podcasts+1 I’d record who actually returns during a test, what they are trying to do, and whether that differs from the customer you imagined. That may change which group you test next.
Reid Hoffman
Reid HoffmanCo-founder of LinkedIn, Inflection AI and Manas AI. Partner at Greylock
The test also has to produce evidence before the company runs out of time or capital. In PayPal's early plans, cash on mobile phones looked like a promising use for our encryption technology, but the team estimated it would take at least three years to build. We shifted to the Palm Pilot because we could get a version working in roughly six months and start learning. Later, eBay sellers adopted the email-payment feature in ways we had not planned, and we followed that demand.YouTube
I would ask a founder to name the next proof point and its date: who must use the first version, what action would show value, and how much money is needed to see that action. If the first meaningful proof lies beyond the team's runway, change the first product or the financing plan before committing.YouTube
Ivan Zhao
Ivan ZhaoFounder of Notion
I would also compare the trial product with the tool people already use for the same work. With Notion, the need for documents was established long before we started. Google Docs was free and good enough for many people, so the real question was whether our first version could do enough of that everyday work while offering a reason to switch. It took us years to reach a remotely comparable baseline.Spotify
For the pressure test, ask someone to complete a familiar task in both products. Watch where they switch back to the old one and where they choose yours again. That gives the team a more useful target than a general statement that the idea sounds interesting.
Reid Hoffman
Reid HoffmanCo-founder of LinkedIn, Inflection AI and Manas AI. Partner at Greylock
A founder should also test whether the behavior that creates value can support a business. At PayPal, we first focused on getting people to use email payments, but we had promised the service would remain free and still needed a way to earn revenue. We eventually required sellers who accepted more than a limited amount of credit-card payments to switch to a merchant account. About 88% of payment volume converted within six weeks, without changing the growth curve.YouTube
I would ask where a fee fits into the user's actual task, then run a small test that measures paid use and whether it slows adoption. A popular free product and a viable paid product are two separate findings.
Ben Silbermann
Ben SilbermannFounder and Chairman of Pinterest. Founder of How We Feel
Reid’s date for the next proof point should include the time it takes to make a change after someone uses the product. Our shopping app had a slow cycle: building a change and getting it approved through the App Store could take weeks or months. With Pinterest, Evan and I could use it ourselves and improve it every day, which helped us learn while the audience was still small.Apple Podcasts
I’d choose a first version that lets the team respond quickly to observed use. If each change takes too long, the founder may spend the whole test period waiting to learn whether a fix helped.
Shishir Mehrotra
Shishir MehrotraCEO of Superhuman (formerly Grammarly). Co-founder of Coda and former Chief Product Officer of YouTube
Ivan's technical-foundation test is a good example of choosing the risk that could invalidate the product promise. For Coda, our promise had two parts: a document had to feel familiar, and someone had to be able to build something as powerful as an app. I put product feasibility ahead of monetization because a pricing test would have told us little if we could not deliver both parts of that experience.alejandrocremades
I would ask a founder to write one sentence describing what users must be able to do, then identify the assumption most likely to make that sentence false. Build the smallest real use case that tests that assumption. If it works, test the next risk, such as repeat use, how people find the product, or willingness to pay. The order depends on which unanswered question could stop the company first.
Emmett Shear
Emmett ShearCEO of Softmax. Founder of Justin.tv and former CEO of Twitch
Ben's bounded period tests something the usage numbers cannot: whether you want the work that follows the first signal. I have said that founders can spend four or five years with early signs of success that fade, trying new things while the outcome stays unclear. Before committing, I would ask whether solving this particular user's problem still appeals to me under those conditions, including the long stretch of recruiting users, fixing failures, and trying again.Spotify
Reid Hoffman
Reid HoffmanCo-founder of LinkedIn, Inflection AI and Manas AI. Partner at Greylock
The financing plan can change the idea you end up testing. At SocialNet, we needed venture funding to keep going. The only offer asked us to partner with newspapers, television stations, and magazines, so we accepted and changed the business model, even though we lacked a clear view of how that approach would work. I later stopped believing in the model we were pursuing.Spotify
Before taking funding tied to a new customer or sales path, I would test that path with the same care as the product. Talk to those customers, find out who makes the purchase, and work out whether the deal still lets the team pursue the reason it started the company.
Ivan Zhao
Ivan ZhaoFounder of Notion
A useful distribution test for a flexible product is whether people create examples you never asked them to make. Notion's community grew in part because people could build their own setups, share templates, teach others, and even sell what they made. The people sharing had their own reasons to do it.Apple Podcasts
For an early product that depends on a community, I would give a small group the basic tools and watch whether anyone makes something useful for another person, then whether that second person can adopt it. That test asks more than whether people like the founder's demo. It checks whether the product gives its first builders a reason to keep creating and sharing.

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In This Conversation

  • Emmett Shear
    Emmett Shear

    CEO of Softmax. Founder of Justin.tv and former CEO of Twitch

  • Ben Silbermann
    Ben Silbermann

    Founder and Chairman of Pinterest. Founder of How We Feel

  • Ivan Zhao
    Ivan Zhao

    Founder of Notion

  • Reid Hoffman
    Reid Hoffman

    Co-founder of LinkedIn, Inflection AI and Manas AI. Partner at Greylock

  • Shishir Mehrotra
    Shishir Mehrotra

    CEO of Superhuman (formerly Grammarly). Co-founder of Coda and former Chief Product Officer of YouTube

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