The Oura IPO is a great example of how venture fund math works. Forerunner led Oura’s ~$29M Series B in 2020. Those shares sit in its Fund IV vehicles, with the flagship fund being just $360M. Fast forward six years: Forerunner owns 28.7M shares, or 9.3% of Oura, and is selling its ENTIRE remaining position in the IPO. At the $42 midpoint, that’s ~$1.2B of liquidity, after already selling $65M back to Oura earlier this year. The main Fund IV entity owns ~88% of the position, so one investment could return roughly $1.1B+ to a $360M fund. Very roughly, that’s 3x+ the entire fund gross and potentially ~2.5x net DPI to LPs after carry from Oura alone. That makes selling a lot easier to understand. The funding history is also pretty wild: 2014/15: ~$2.4M Seed — Lifeline 2016-19: ~$17M Series A — David Shuman 2020: ~$29M Series B — Forerunner 2021: ~$255M Series C — Bedford Ridge 2024: $200M Series D — Fidelity/Dexcom 2025: ~$908M Series E — Fidelity led 2026: IPO at $40-$44/share What’s interesting is who is selling. Forerunner: selling 100% Lifeline: taking hundreds of millions in liquidity but keeping a position Fidelity: selling 0 Bedford Ridge: selling 0 And 73% of the base IPO itself is secondary shares. Existing shareholders are selling ~$1.5B at the midpoint, with Forerunner accounting for ~$1.2B of it. You can look at Forerunner selling everything and wonder what that says about future upside. But from a venture perspective, the math is pretty simple. If one investment can return ~3x your entire fund in cash, you take the DPI. Could Oura be worth $30B or $50B someday? Sure. But VCs ultimately get paid to return money to LPs, not hold paper gains forever.